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DEFENDER, PROSECUTOR, DEFENDANT 
Plea Bargaining - Three Perspectives 
BY JULIE HORNEY* 
I N RECENT YEARS the administra-tion of criminal justice in this country 
has become increasingly dominated by 
the process known as "plea bargaining." 
In plea bargaining a defendant waives 
the right to trial by pleading guilty in 
return for certain advantages offered by 
the state. The state benefits in terms of 
the time and money saved by avoiding 
a trial. The practice is so pervasive that in 
many jurisdictions fewer than 10 percent 
of the criminal defendants ever stand 
trial. 
Plea bargaining may be thought of 
as a complex decision making process 
involving three individuals-the prosecutor, 
defense attorney, and defendant-who 
must make judgments on a number of 
factors related to the case in order to 
reach some agreement. The present study 
looked at plea bargaining in Douglas 
County, Nebraska from those three per-
spectives. 
Plea Bargaining Practice 
Two basic types of plea bargaining 
can be differentiated according to the 
nature of the offer made to the defendant. 
In the first type of plea bargaining the 
prosecutor's offer is a concession on the 
sentence to be imposed. In some juris-
dictions the prosecutor offers a particular 
sentence which has already been agreed 
to by the judge. In many jurisdictions, 
however, the judge does not actively 
participate in the process. In that case 
any sentence concession by the prosecutor 
is merely an offer either to recommend 
a particular sentence to the judge or to 
*The author would like to thank all of those 
who participated in the study. 
Plea bargaining, generally a poor-
ly understood process, seems to be 
receiving more scrutiny as its use 
widens. 
Providing for formalized plea 
bargaining practices is the aim of a 
bill introduced in the Nebraska 
Legislature by Senator Larry Stoney 
of Omaha. 
Stoney's bill, LB 371, grew out 
of a meeting held last year by 
the National Advisory Commission 
on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals_ 
The author of the following 
article was the recipient of last 
year's summer urban research grant, 
awarded by CAUR to a faculty 
member. She is an assistant pro-
fessor of criminal justice at UNO. 
make no recommendation (e.g., promising 
not to ask for capital punishment in a 
murder case). 
In the second type of plea bargaining 
the defendant agrees to enter a guilty 
plea, and in return the prosecutor reduces 
the charges filed against the defendant. 
The reduction may either be in terms of 
seriousness of the charge (e.g. , reducing a 
felony charge to a misdemeanor or a first 
degree murder charge to second degree 
murder) or in terms of the number of 
charges filed (when the person is charged 
with several different crimes or with 
charges representing multiple elements of 
one criminal act). 
From the defendant's point of view, 
of course, the motivating factor in both 
types of plea bargaining is the same-the 
belief that the final consequence will be 
less serious if he/she pleads guilty. In 
one case a lighter sentence is directly 
promised; in the other the assumption 
is made that reduction of the charges 
will result in a lighter sentence. 
One issue in plea bargaining is whether 
defendants in fact get anything of value 
in return for pleading guilty. Alschuler 
(1968) suggested that when a prosecutor 
dismisses some of the charges in a multi-
count indictment, he is giving the defen-
dant the "sleeves from his vest" (p. 95). 
In many jurisdictions judges seldom sen-
tence consecutively ; instead, sentences 
for multiple charges would be served 
concurrently. Also, even though the pros-
ecutor has dropped or reduced charges, 
the judge is aware of the original charges 
and may still use that information in 
sentencing. The latitude in sentencing 
allowed by most legislatures (e.g., robbery 
carrying 3 to 50 years) may enable the 
judge to give exactly the same sentence 
he/she would have given for the original 
charge. Alschuler stated that for these 
reasons most prosecutors feel that they 
are not giving up anything in terms of 
sentence severity in return for certainty 
of conviction. 
One question which may be raised in 
connection with this issue is whether the 
value of a deal systematically varies with 
the type of deal. Another is to what 
extent the prosecutor, defense attorney, 
and defendant agree on the value of a 
deal. 
Research on Plea Bargaining 
Most of the research on plea bargaining 
has dealt with the factors which determine 
(Continued on Page 2) 
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when bargaining will occur and how the 
parties involved arrive at particular deals. 
Factors which have been suggested as 
determinants of whether or not a plea 
bargain is entered include the strength of 
the state's case, the nature of the crime 
charged, the defendant's record, the in-
terests of justice and equity, cost of a 
trial, the ability of the defense attorney, 
the relationship between prosecutor and 
defense attorney, and the workload of the 
attorneys. Generally interviews or ques-
tionnaires have been used to ask prose-
cutors or defense attorneys what factors 
they consider in making their decisions. 
A recent survey of Nebraska prose-
cutors (Kray and Berman, 1978) presented 
a number of factors related to the plea 
bargaining decision and asked respondents 
to rank the three factors which they felt 
were most important. Those which re-
ceived the greatest percentages of "most 
important" rankings were nature of the 
crime (ranked first by 38 percent of the 
respondents), strength of the case (23 
percent), interest of justice (21 percent) 
and defendant's criminal record (14 per-
cent). 
The practice of plea bargaining is 
so pervasive that in many juris-
dictions fewer than 10 percent of 
the criminal defendants ever stand 
trial. 
A further question is how the various 
factors relate to the value of a deal. 
Alschuler (1968) suggested that the 
weaker the prosecutor's case against a 
defendant the better the deal offered. No 
studies, however, have systematically de-
termined how value varies with such 
factors. 
The evidence to date on plea bargaining 
has been largely anecdotal or else based 
on broadly phrased questions about gen-
eral plea bargaining practice. The present 
research was designed to study plea 
bargaining and the perspectives on plea 
bargaining of the prosecutor, defense 
attorney, and defendant in a more precise 
manner, with regard to actual cases, and 
in a way that would allow direct compari-
son of those perspectives. It was also 
designed to obtain data on the value of 
deals, to measure the participants' judg-
ments on the relevant factors in each case, 
and to allow an assessment of the relation-
ship between those factors and the value 
of deals. 
Methods Used 
This research examined plea bargaining 
practice in Douglas County, Nebraska. 
In the county attorney 's office seven 
deputy county attorneys rotate weekly 
in the job of filing charges for new arrests. 
The attorney who files the charges then 
handles that case until a disposition 
occurs. Five assistant public defenders 
for Douglas County rotate in a similar 
manner. 
By keeping in regular contact with 
these attorneys an attempt was made to 
interview the three individuals involved 
in a case as close as possible to the time 
at which either a guilty plea was entered 
or a decision to go to trial was reached. 
This study was conducted for all felony 
cases corning through the prosecutor's 
office for a two month period in 1978. 
A total of 99 cases were included in 
this study. The prosecutor was inter-
viewed in every case, as was the defense 
attorney if that person was a public 
defender. In a few cases contact with 
the private defense attorney was not 
possible. Out of the 99 cases, 60 involved 
public defenders and 39 involved private 
defense attorneys. The private defense 
attorneys (19 different attorneys) were 
interviewed for 29 of those cases. 
In many of the cases an interview 
with the defendant was not feasible. 
Many of the defendants were not being 
held in jail, and their only contact with 
their attorneys was at the time of entering 
a guilty plea or at trial. Because the 
entering of guilty pleas was not scheduled. 
and often occurred on the spur of the 
moment, the interviewer could not always 
be present at that time. Often these 
pleas were being entered in two or three 
courtrooms at the same time. For as 
many cases as possible, however, the 
defendants were interviewed either at 
the time of entering a plea or within the 
next two or three days in the case of 
those defendants being held in jail. A 
total of 28 defendants were interviewed. 
Defendants were given a letter explaining 
the nature of the research and assuring 
them that their participation was totally 
voluntary and that all of their responses 
would be confidential. Only one defen-
dant refused to be interviewed. 
Standardized Interviews 
The interviews were standardized, ;tnd 
all respondents gave a series of ratings 
by moving a pointer on a portable graphic 
scale. The scale was unmarked for the 
respondent, but for every question the 
experimenter labelled the endpoints with 
3" x 5" index cards with appropriate 
phrases written on them. The back of the 
scale was marked off in 1 mm units from 
1 to 100 so that the experimenter could 
record the response numerically. 
All of the attorneys were asked the same 
questions (with slight wording changes 
appropriate to the prosecutor or defense 
attorney). They were asked to use the 
portable scale to provide ratings on the 
following dimensions: 
1. likelihood of defendant's convic-
tion at trial (endpoints marked 
"certain conviction" and "certain 
acquittal") 
2. value of the deal to the defendant 
3. seriousness of the crime 
4. certainty of defendant's guilt 
5. seriousness of defendant's prior 
record 
6. likelihood of defendant's commit-
ting another felony in the future 
7. degree of punishment deserved by 
defendant 
8. ability of other attorney as a trial 
advocate 
9. personal relationship with other 
attorney 
10. present workload 
11. publicity received by case 
12. satisfaction with case outcome 
In addition to the questions calling 
for rating responses attorneys were also 
asked to estimate the number of days the 
case would take for a trial, the sentence 
they expected the defendant to receive 
if convicted at trial, and the sentence 
expected for pleading guilty to the re-
duced charge(s) (if the charge(s) had been 
reduced). 
Defendants were also asked to use the 
portable scale to give ratings on the 
following dimensions: 
1. likelihood of conviction at trial 
2. value of deal 
3. job done by defense attorney 
4. relationship with defense attorney 
5. satisfaction with way in which case 
was handled 
Findings and Discussion 
Four major categories can be used 
to describe plea bargaining offers by the 
prosecutor: 1) no deal, 2) reduction of 
charges, 3) not filing additional charges, 
and 4) promise of sentence. Table 1 
shows the number of cases which fell 
into each category. 
1) In 27 of the 99 cases no deal was 
offered by the prosecutor. In other words, 
the defendant's only choice was to plead 
not guilty or to plead guilty to the 
original charge(s). 
2) In 63 cases the prosecutor offered 
to reduce the charges in return for a plea 
(Continued on Page 3) 
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of guilty. In 24 of these cases a charge 
which was originally a felony was reduced 
to a misdemeanor (e.g., from burglary 
to trespassing). In 18 cases involving 
different charges at least one of the 
charges was dropped (e.g., original charges 
of robbery and use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony reduced to rob-
bery alone). A reduction to a lesser 
felony was offered in 13 cases (e.g., from 
shooting with intent to kill, wound, or 
maim to assault with intent to do great 
bodily injury). Finally eight cases involved 
the dropping of one or more counts of 
a crime when several counts of the same 
offense were charged (e.g., three counts 
of burglary). 
3) Eight cases represented a slightly 
different kind of deal. In return for the 
guilty plea the defendant was promised 
that additional charges would not be 
filed. In five of these cases the prosecutor 
offered not to file on other instances of 
the same crime charged (most typically 
a promise not to file on additional bad 
checks written). Three cases involved the 
special situation in which the defendant 
was eligible to be charged as an habitual 
criminal, a charge which increases the 
sentence for the original crime charged. In 
these three cases the prosecutors offered 
not to file that charge if the defendant 
would plead guilty to the original charge 
(all three cases involved other charge 
reductions, but the possibility of the 
habitual criminal charge being filed was 
reported by all parties as the crucial 
factor). 
4) Finally, one case was unique in that 
it involved a promise of sentence. A 
defendant who had already been tried 
and convicted of a felony, and in fact 
had served some of his time, had his 
case overturned by the Nebraska Supreme 
Court. In order to avoid retrying the 
person, the prosecutor and judge promised 
a particular sentence if he would plead 
guilty, and he accepted. 
TABLE 1 
TYPES OF PLEA BARGA INS OFF ERED 
Number 
Type of Bargain Offered of Cases 
No Deal 27 
Reduction of Charges (63 cases) 
Felony to Misdemeanor 24 
Drop Charges 18 
Lesser Felony 13 
Drop Counts 8 
Not Filing Additional Charges (8 cases) 
No Add iti onal Counts 5 
No Habitual Criminal 3 
Promise of Sentence 1 
Total Cases 99 
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CAUR Publishes New Brochure 
"SERVICE TO COMMUNITIES" is the tide of a brochure just published by the 
Center for Applied Urban Research. The new pamphlet describes the scope of the 
Center's activities in applied research, the technical assistance it is able to offer groups 
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be obtained by writing to the Center for Applied Urban Research, University of 
Nebraska at Omaha, Annex 15, Omaha, Nebraska 68182. Shown above is one of the 
illustrations for the brochure, the former Storz mansion at 6625 Dodge Street where 
the Center has its offices. 
The categories described above repre-
sent the offers made by the prosecutors. 
ln only eight of the 99 cases did the 
defendant plead not guilty. Four of the 
not guilty pleas were in cases where no 
deal had been offered. The other four not 
guilty pleas were refusals of deals offered 
by the prosecutor. 
Value of Deals 
Do these different kinds of deals 
offered to defendants differ in value to 
the defendant? Ideally the actual out-
come after a plea bargain should be com-
pared with what would have happened 
to the defendant if he/she had been 
convicted on the original charge. Because 
of the wide range of possible sentences 
in each case and the amount of discretion 
left to the judge, what would have 
happened if not for the plea bargain is 
impossible to determine from the statu-
tory sentencing provisions. Therefore the 
value of the deal was determined by 
questioning the prosecutors and defense 
attorneys who based their judgments on 
their experience in the system. First they 
were asked to use the graphic scale to 
measure value to the defendant directly. 
Then they were also asked to predict the 
sentence which would follow the plea 
bargain and to give their best estimate 
of what sentence would have followed 
conviction at trial. The difference between 
these estimates also serves as a measure 
of value. Table 2 presents these data. 
The average responses for prosecutors and 
defense attorneys to the question, " How 
would you rate the value of this deal to 
the defendant?" are classified according 
to the nature of the deal (100 represented 
"extremely valuable" and 0 represented 
"not at all valuable"). The average differ-
ences between the plea bargain sentence 
and trial conviction sentence are also 
presented in terms of years (these are 
values averaged together for prosecutors 
and defense attorneys). In all cases the 
values assigned to the various deals are 
significantly different from one another. 
In terms of ranking by direct rating of 
value both prosecutor and defense counsel 
viewed "felony to misdemeanor," "no 
habitual criminal," and "lesser felony" as 
the most valuable deals. "Drop counts" 
and "no additional counts" were seen as 
the least valuable. 
The ranking by sentence differential 
is similar to that by rated val ue.1 "Drop 
charges" is again in the middle. One 
major exception to the correspondence is 
the "felony to misdemeanor" reduction, 
which appears to cause the least sentencing 
differential but was rated by prosecutors 
and defense attorneys as either the first 
(Continued on Page 4) 
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THREE MEASURES OF 
Felony to 
Misdemeanor 
Prosecutors' ratings 66.0 
Defense attorneys' ratings 82.1 
Sentence differential 0.5 
(Continued from Page 3) 
or second most valuable deal. The value 
of a deal is not based only on sentencing 
differential. The reduction of a felony to 
a misdemeanor was viewed as quite valu-
able because it avoids a felony conviction 
on the person's record, and yet reduction 
was often offered in cases in which the 
person was very likely to be given pro-
bation anyway so that the sentencing 
differential would be zero. 
Comparison of Three Perspectives 
In order to compare the perspectives 
of the prosecutor, defense attorney, and 
defendant the average ratings for those 
groups obtained through the interview 
items can be examined. In addition an 
analysis of the correlation between prose-
cutors' ratings and defense attorneys' 
ratings provides a measure of the extent 
to which they agree on the ordering of 
cases along each dimension. 
Table 3 presents the mean ratings 
for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
defendants, the results of significance 
tests for differences in the means, and 
the correlations between ratings.2 Popular 
notions of the difference in prosecutorial 
and defense orientations are supported 
in the ratings of seriousness of crimes and 
amount of punishment deserved by the 
defendant. Prosecutors, on the average, 
viewed crimes as more serious than did 
defense attorneys and viewed defendants 
as deserving more punishment. Prosecutors 
also saw the plea bargains they struck as 
less valuable to the defendant than did 
the defense attorneys. This may reflect 
the fact that prosecutors do not want to 
be viewed as letting criminals off with 
less than they deserve and the fact that 
defense attorneys want to appear to have 
done some good for their clients. This 
difference is not large, however, and their 
agreement on specific deals is seen in 
the significant correlation between their 
ratings of value. 
Those defendants who were interviewed 
showed the highest ratings of value of 
the deal. Although this result is not 
conclusive because of the small number 
of defendants, it is in the direction which 
might indicate that defendants think they 
are getting better deals than they really 
are. 
TABLE 2 
THE VALUE OF PLEA BARGAINS OFFERED BY TYPE OF DEAL 
No Lesser Drop 
Habitual Criminal Felony Charges 
77.0 64.5 44.8 
77.3 80.6 65.5 
6.3 9.1 2.2 
The prosecutors were more satisfied 
with cases than the defense attorneys or 
defendants-a result which probably re-
flects accurately the way in which the 
cards are stacked in the prosecutor's 
favor. Prosecutors are not eager to prose-
cute possibly innocent persons or to lose 
cases in court, so they usually screen 
cases carefully before filing charges. 
A pessimistic outlook of defense attor-
neys may also explain the fact that they 
rated the likelihood of conviction higher 
than the prosecutors did. Alternatively 
this finding may reflect the defense 
attorney's wish to be seen as having done 
some good for his/her client. A plea 
bargain is always more valuable if con-
viction at trial is a certainty. The 
defendants seemed to be slightly more 
optimistic; their ratings on likelihood of 
conviction were closer to those of the 
prosecutor. 
A difference was found in ratings of 
workloads, with defense attorneys rating 
theirs as heavier, and, finally, a small 
but significant difference was found be-
tween prosecutors' and defense attorneys' 
estimates of the number of days a trial 
would take. In the other ratings prose-
cutors and defense attorneys did not 
differ significantly. For example, both 
groups were very certain of the defen-
dants' guilt. This fact is not surprising 
Drop No Additional 
Counts Counts F 
33.6 42.5 3.21 p .05 
42.0 37.8 4.44 p .05 
0.7 0.7 3.57 p .05 
in light of the screening which occurs 
before cases reach this point. 
In general the prosecutors and defense 
attorneys showed considerable agreement 
on particular cases, as is shown by the 
large, significant correlations between 
their judgments of seriousness of crime, 
value of deal, seriousness of prior record, 
and likelihood of future felony. The 
extent of their agreement is not surprising 
given their experience in the same system; 
it is especially understandable in the case 
of public defenders and prosecutors who 
work so closely together. 
Defense Attorneys Rated High 
Contrary to popular notions, defense 
attorneys were rated relatively high by 
defendants in terms of how well they 
had handled the cases and in terms of the 
personal relationship between attorney 
and client. Since Casper (1971) has de-
scribed the very negative attitude of 
defendants toward public defenders, the 
data were classified by type of defense 
attorney in order to determine whether 
the high ratings were due primarily to 
defend;,mts being represented by private 
attorneys. Although private attorneys 
were rated somewhat higher as to how 
well they had handled the cases (an 
average rating of 78.8 as opposed to 68.7 
(Continued on Page 5) 
TABLE 3 
RATINGS OF CASES BY PROSECUTORS, 
DEFENSE ATTORN EYS, AND DEFENDANTS 
Defense 
Prosecutor Attorney df t r Defendant 
Seriousness of crime 47.1 37.7 88 4.36* .67* 
Degree of punishment deserved 32.6 20.9 88 5.76* .58* 
Value of deal 40.4 51.4 83 3.28* .50*.21 76.5 
Satisfaction w ith case 81.9 69.4 74 2.74* -.16 52.6 
Likel ihood of conviction 78.3 86.0 88 3.49* .53* 58.7 
Present workload 45.3 54.3 71 3.19* .01 
Number of days for trial 2.0 2.8 98 3.07* .17 
Certainty of guilt 93.1 90.5 87 1.53 .54* 
Seriousness of prior record 31.3 27.6 88 1.75 .68* 
Likelihood of future felony 52.0 47.2 87 1.94 .64* 
Publicity case has received 8.2 8.7 88 0.35 .64* 
Other attorney's trial ability 58.1 64.7 75 1.88 -.26 
Relationship with other attorney 70.7 71.9 75 0.11 .34* 
Job attorney has done 70.9 
Personal relationship with attorney 80.9 
* p < .01 
_g_ /Based only on cases in which deals were of fered. 
(Continued from Page 4) 
for public defenders), the difference was 
not significant, and the public defenders 
were still rated quite high. This was also 
true for the ratings of personal relation-
ship (86.7 for private attorneys and 79.4 
for public defenders) in spite of the often 
heard complaint that public defenders 
never have time to see their clients. 
No significant differences occurred be-
tween prosecutors' ratings of defense 
attorneys when these were classified as 
public or private. This was true for ratings 
of trial ability and personal relationships. 
Interrelationship of Judgments 
The correlation coefficients in Table 3 
represent the extent of agreement be-
tween prosecutor and defense attorney on 
the dimensions rated. Correlation analysis 
can also indicate how those dimensions 
were related to each other within those 
groups-in particular how case background 
factors related to the value of the deal 
offered. In Tables 4 and 5 the inter-
correlations of all factors are presented 
separately for prosecutors and defense 
attorneys. Table 4 shows that prosecutors' 
judgments of degree of punishment de-
served were strongly related to their 
perceptions of seriousness of the crime, 
the defendant's prior record, and the 
likelihood of the defendant's committing 
a felony in the future. Table 5 indicates 
that these same factors were all related 
for defense attorneys as well, although 
the relationship between prior record and 
punishment deserved was not as strong. 
For both prosecutors and defense attor-
neys, judgments of publicity received by 
the case and number of days a trial would 
take were quite appropriately correlated 
with the seriousness of the crime. 
Deal Decision Making 
In trying to understand the decision 
making process involved in plea bargain-
ing, one strategy is to compare the 
attorneys' ratings of the value of the 
deals offered with their ratings of the 
factors relating to the defendant and 
his/her case. This analysis should show 
whether better deals are given when likeli-
hood of conviction is low, for example, 
or when the defendant is viewed as 
unlikely to commit another felony or as 
deserving little punishment. Caution must 
be observed in making any causal inference 
TABLE 4 
Page 5 
from the correlations, but they may give 
some idea of the factors which contribute 
to the outcome. 
Tables 4 and 5 show that none of 
these correlations between value of the 
deal and other factors is very large. The 
correlation between ratings of likelihood 
of conviction and value of the deal by 
the prosecutor (-.18) is in the direction 
predicted by Alschuler (the weaker the 
case the better the deal offered), but it 
is not significant at the .01 level. From 
these results how the value of a deal is 
determined is not clear. One possibility 
is that other factors not considered here 
may influence the process. Possibly a 
large random factor is s1mply involved. 
Still another possibility is that in some 
cases the factors rated here may be 
relevant to bargaining decisions while 
other cases may involve deals which are 
so routine that none of these factors is 
considered. Evaluating all cases together 
could mask the relationships existing for 
some cases. A larger sample will be 
necessary for testing that hypothesis. 
(Continued on Page 8) 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF PROSECUTORS' RATINGS 
Future Trial Personal Work Number 
Conviction Crime Guilt Record Felony Punishment Ability Relationship Load Publicity Satisfaction Days 
Conviction -
Crime .04 -
Guilt .58* .08 -
Record .05 .26* .08 -
Future felony .13 .15 .15 .73* -
Punishment -.03 .56* .00 .74* .56* -
Trial ability -.12 -.01 -.19 .10 .21 .13 -
Personal rel ationship -.02 -.03 .10 .05 .11 .00 .29* -
Work load -.15 -.01 -.19 .1 2 .03 .11 .22 .24* -
Publicity -.05 .44* .01 .30* .19 .47* .10 -.08 -.12 -
Satisfaction .46* .00 .55* -.13 -.10 -.22 -.19 .1 7 .20 .01 -
Number days .04 .25* .07 .26* .13 .30* -.06 -.13 -.05 .29* .06 -
Value of deal -.18 .06 -.17 -.02 -.05 -.00 -.06 -.12 -.07 .19 -.33* .05 
* p < .01 
TABLE 5 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF DEFENSE ATTORNEYS' RATINGS 
Future Trial Personal Work Number 
Conviction Crime Guilt Record Felony Punishment Ability Relationship Load Publicity Satisfaction Days 
Conviction -
Crime -.21 -
Guilt .35* .04 -
Record .11 .09 .08 -
Future felony .18 .28 .09 .62* -
Punishment .02 .62* .13 .34* .52* -
Trial ability .07 .18 .03 .1 7 .22 .24 -
Personal relationship .05 -.05 -.07 -.16 -.15 -.20 -.37* 
-
Work load .11 .13 .05 -.21 -.13 .09 .06 .01 -
Publicity -.20 .51* .07 .17 .18 .28* .16 -.08 .06 -
Satisfaction -.10 -.23 -.03 -.18 -.38* -.32* -.07 -.07 .36* -.06 -
Number days -.01 .43* .10 .12 .14 .41 * .19 -.10 .28* .33* .07 -
Value of deal -.19 .10 -.11 -.07 -.09 .02 .13 -.19 .27 .10 .13 .15 
* p < .01 
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NEW HOME MORTGAGES 
TABLE 1 
OUTSTANDING LOANS FOR NEW HOUSING UNITS IN SUBDIVISIONS OF DOUGLAS AND SARPY COUNTIES, NOVEMBER, 1978 
Speculative Loans Pre-Sold Loans 
Units Under Units Under Units 
Construction Sold f--'C:..:o:.cn:.::s.:..tr..::u.:..c.:..ti.:..o __ n_ _,compl eted 
Subdivision 
Douglas County 
Armbrust Oaks 
Armbrust Park 
Ash I and Park 
Autumn Heights 
Benson Acres 
Current 
Period 
Total 
Out-
standing 
3 
1 
16 
25 
Current 
Period 
3 
Total 
Current Out-
Period standing 
2 
3 
55 
3 
Current 
Period 
-8~~;------------------------------------4---------
Brighton Square 4 1 2 
Candlewood 2 11 15 
Center Park 3 37 2 9 1 
-~~~~~~~~~------~-----~-----~-----------~-----~---Colonial Acres 3 7 
Crescent Oaks 
Discovery 
Eldorado 
Fair Meadows 
Fountain Hills 
Georgetowne 
Ginger Cove 
Ginger Woods 
Glenbrook 
Green Meadows 
Greenbrier 
Green tree 
Harvey Oaks 
6 
7 
3 
4 
18 
8 
38 
10 
10 
8 
1 
1 
6 
6 
4 
63 
1 
11 
7 
22 
6 
4 
3 
4 
2 
2 
7 
Homestead 2 1 
1 
28 
7 
-TheKno~s---------,----23 _____ 5 _____ 5 ____ 23 _____ 2 __ _ 
Kristy Acres 2 1 
Lakeview Heights 16 3 
Leawood 8 
Leawood Southwest 17 3 3 
-l~~-----------------,7-----,----------,4---------
Maenner Meadows 2 2 
Maple Village, Replat & Ill 8 20 3 2 
Millard Heights & Replat 1 9 4 28 
Montclair West 3 
-Moiit;;;y--vi!i;~------3-----7----------2----7---------
0ak Heights 1,11 , 111, & IV 41 14 1 
Oak Hills Estates 4 1 
Oak Hills Highlands 1 3 
_ Oak_!ii_!!:_~!!!!?E ___________ 2~-----------------~---------
0iive Crest Estates 1 5 
Pacific Heights & Replat 4 32 4 15 2 
Park Lane 4 
Patterson's Park 3 
-~~~~~~:..---------------~---------------------------Perry's Park 1 3 
Pheasant Run & Replat 1 5 9 2 
Piedmont & Replat 8 23 5 1 10 
Pine Ridge 1 2 
-~~~~~~----------------~-----------------~---------Ponderosa 2 12 1 4 
Prairie Village 3 
Quail Ridge 4 
Ralston, City of 3 
-~~~~~~~--------------~~-----~-----~-----~---------
Ramblewood 1 5 
Raven Oaks 1 3 14 
Regency 2 7 1 17 
Riverside Lakes 4 
Roanoke Estates 
Rose Garden Estates 
Rosemont 
3 
1 
12 
5 
8 
4 
4 
Speculative Loans Pre-Sold Loans 
Units Under Units Under Units 
Construction Sold 1--C_o_n_s_tr_u_ct_i_o_n _ _,Completec 
Subdivision 
Current 
Period 
Douglas County Continued 
Roxbury 
Saddle Hills 
Silver Fox 
Sky I ine Estates 
Total 
Out-
standing 
4 
3 
2 
7 
Current 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Total 
Out-
standing 
1 
9 
2 
12 
Current 
Period 
-~~~~~~~£~~------------~---------------------------
Southside Acres 
Stony Brook 
Sunnyslope 
Timbercreek I, II , & I l l 
1 
4 
4 
2 
6 
16 
3 
_!~~~~~----------------------------------~---------
Twin Oaks 8 
Twin River Vista II 3 
Walnut Grove 20 4 9 
Weir Crest 6 1 
-~!~~~~~---------------~--------------------------
Western Trails 12 5 
Willow Wood 37 4 1 1 
Winchester Heights 6 
Woodgate 3 
-~£~~~~~--------------~~-----~-----------------~--
Woodhurst 4 
Woodstone Replat 4 1 
Wycliffe & Replat 40 4 2 3 
Rural Douglas County 1 3 6 
Other Subdivisions.l!l 2 32 4 7 80 8 
---------------------------------------------------Total Douglas County 70 850 73 34 527 69 
Sorpy County 
Briarwood 2 4 
Charwood 5 1 
-~~~~~-----------------~-----~-----------~---------College Heights 1 5 3 
Crestview Heights 27 4 
Evening Vue 1 2 
Fairview Heights 2 3 
-~~~~!2~~-------------2~-----~-----~-----------~---Fau lkland Heights 3 20 2 4 
Grenada II 1 3 
Granville East, II 6 5 
Hidden Hills 1 4 1 
-~~~~~~~:.. _____________ 2~-----~-----------~---------
Hawaiian Village 7 6 2 
Leawood Oaks I & II 1 36 1 1 9 
Leawood South 3 11 
Maclad Heights 6 2 1 
_!~-~~~~--------~-----~---------------------------Monarch Place 7 56 7 1 
Normandy Hills 5 6 
Overland Hi lis 10 2 
Park Hills I , Ill, & IV 2 6 4 8 
-~~~~-~~:..--------~----2~-----------------~---------South Woods 4 9 2 
Southampton 1 17 1 1 
South ern Park 4 1 1 1 
Sun Valley Park 4 1 
-~~~r~~-~~~~-----------------~-----------~---------
v illa Springs 1 3 
Whispering Timbers 1 21 1 3 1 
Willow Springs (The Town) 3 
Rural Sarpy County 1 
Other Subdivisions.l!l 2 21 2 1 1 e 3 
Total Sarpy County 28 345 21 7 106 12 
Totals 98 1,195 94 4 1 633 81 
1!1 Includes subdivisi ons with no more than 2 units either under construction and/or completed and unsold. 
Sources: Compil ed by CAUR from data provided by the American National Bank, Center Bank, Commercial Federal S & L, ConservativeS & L, First Federal 
Lincoln, First Federal S & L Omaha, First National Bank o f Bellevue, Nebraska Federal S & L , Northland Mortgage, Northwestern National Bank, Occidental S & L, 
Omaha National Bank, OmahaS & L , Packers National Bank, U.S. National Bank, and Western Securities Company. 
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TABLE 2 
OUTSTANDING LOANS FOR NEW HOUSING UNITS IN SUBDIVISIONS OF DOUGLAS AND SARPY COUNTIES, DECEMBER, 1978 
Speculative Loans Pre-Sold Loans 
Units Under Units Under Units 
Construction Sold 1--...::Co:oo:.:.n:.::s~tr_,u.::ct~i.::o:.;.n-lCompleted 
Subdivision 
Douglas County 
Armbrust Oaks 
Armbrust Park 
Ashland Park 
Current 
Period 
Total 
Out-
standing 
3 
1 
16 
Current 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Total 
Out-
standing 
3 
Current 
Period 
Autumn Heights 12 37 52 3 
Brau's 4 
-sri~~nsq~~;------------4-----------------2---------
Bruhn Acres 1 3 
Candlewood 1 12 1 14 2 
Center Park 1 36 2 1 1 0 
Champion's Meadow V iew 1 3 
-c~PB!Hill _________ 3 _____ 6-----------------,---------
~oo~~es 3 7 
Crescent Oaks 5 22 1 
Discovery 4 10 2 10 21 11 
-~~~~<!_o-----------~----~~----2~-----~-----~-----~---
Fair Meadows 10 
Fountain Hills 1 11 3 7 
Georgetowne B 3 
Ginger Cove 1 4 
Ginger Woods 1 2 2 
-G~nbr~~----------,-----7-----------------2---------
Green Meadows 6 1 
Greenbrier 6 1 
Greentree 4 8 1 
Harvey Oaks, Ill 4 62 5 1 2 
-H~m~~;d---------------2-----------------,---------
The Knolls 4 24 3 2 19 6 
Kristy Acres 2 1 
Lakeview Heights 16 3 
Leawood 8 
-l~~ood~~~~~~----2----,9-----------------2-----,---
Lebeau 17 1 2 2 
Lebeau West 4 5 
Maenner Meadows 2 2 
Maple Village & Replat 3 22 1 1 1 
-Milia.:d-Hei!iilt5&-Re"iii;;1 _______ 9 ________________ 25 _____ 3 __ _ 
Montclair West 3 1 1 
Monterey V illage 7 6 1 
Oak Heights I , II , Ill , & IV 39 2 1 15 
Oak Hills Estates 4 
-oakHi~5Hi9~~d;----------,-----------------2-----,---
oak Hills Hilltop 10 1 4 
a~~- 4 1 
Pacific Heights & Replat 2 30 4 1 14 2 
Park Lane 4 
-~«-e~~~sPa~-------,-----4---------------------------
Perry's Park 1 1 4 
Pheasant Au n & Replat 1 6 2 11 
Piedmont & Replat 4 27 9 1 
Pine Ridge 1 2 
-Piailt~~~----------------,-----------------4-----,---
Ponderosa 1 2 1 2 3 
Quail Ridge 1 5 
Ralston 3 
Rambleridge 4 29 1 2 7 2 
-R~eno~s---------,-----4-----------,----,5---------
Regency. I V 2 9 17 
Roanoke Estates 12 1 1 
Rose Garden Estates 5 2 3 
Rosemont 
Roxbury 
Saddle Hi lls 
8 
4 
3 
1 
9 
Speculative Loans Pre-Sold Loans 
Units Under Units Under Units 
Constructi on Sold 1-.:::C:::o::..:n.::.Ste.:.r:::.uC:::t"'i o~n"---l Completed 
Subdivisi on 
Current 
Period 
Douglas County Continued 
Silver Fox 
Skyline Estates 1 
Skyline Ranches & Ill 
Southside Acres 
Total 
Out-
standing 
2 
8 
4 
1 
Current 
Period 
Total 
Current Out-
Period standing 
2 
10 
1 
2 
Current 
Period 
2 
Stony Brook 4 3 
-s~~v~op;---------------------------------6--------
Timbercreek I, I I & Ill 3 1 B 24 
Treehouse 5 
Twin Oaks 8 
Twin River V ista II 3 
-w;l~ut-G~~ve _____________ 2o _________________ 8 _____ , __ _ 
Weir Crest 6 1 
West Village 4 1 1 
Western Trails 12 1 6 
Willow Wood 1 38 18 15 3 
-w~~h~re~H;~~s-----------------------------5-----,---
woodgate 3 
Woodhaven 3 42 1 1 1 
Woodhurst 3 1 
Woodstone Replat 4 1 
-wvcl~fu&-R~~~----10 ____ 47 _____ 3 _________________ 4 __ 
Rural Douglas County 
Other Subdivisions.l!l 
Total Douglas County 
Sarpy County 
6 
96 
3 1 7 
38 3 8 90 
905 41 77 539 
17 
81 
-s~~R~g~---------------,-----------,-----2---------
eriarwood 1 1 3 1 
Charwood 5 1 
Citta's I 5 3 
College Heights 4 1 3 
-c~5Ni;;H;;9~~----------27 _________________ 4 ________ _ 
Evening Vue 1 2 
Fairview Heights 2 3 
Falcon Forest 12 
Faulkland Heights 18 2 4 
-Ci~;;ile-EaSi:-iT------------6-----------5----,o---------
Harvest Hills 
Hawaiian V illage 
Hidden Hills 
Leawood Oaks I & II 
18 
6 
1 
36 
2 
1 
5 
2 
9 
-l~~o~-~~~------------,,--------------------------
Maclad Heights 6 2 
The Meadows 7 
Monarch Place 3 58 1 1 1 
Normandy Hills 4 1 6 
-oak-Hi~s~"P;p;lii~n----5-----5---------------------------
overland Hills 10 
ParkHillsi. III ,&IV 4 2 2 6 
Pawnee Hills 17 4 
South Woods 7 2 1 3 
-So~t~~pto~-------------17-----------------,---------
Southern Park 4 1 
Sun Valley 4 
Sunnyview Estates 5 
Vi lla Springs 1 3 
-w;tmom&-R~i;;~----7-----s---------------------------
whispering Timbers 19 2 2 1 
Wi llow Springs (The Town) 3 
Rural Sarpy County 1 
Other Subdivisions.l!l 3 22 1 15 11 
Total Sarpy County 20 350 16 8 98 22 
Totals 116 1.255 57 85 637 103 
J!/ lncludes subdivisions with no more than 2 units either under construction and/or completed and unsold. 
Sources: Compiled by CAUR from data provided by the American Nat ional Bank, Center Bank, Commercial Federal S & L, ConservativeS & L, First Federal 
Lincoln, First Federal S & L Omaha, Nebraska FederalS & L, Northland Mortgage, Northwestern National Bank, Occidental S & L, Omaha National Bank, OmahaS & L. 
Packers National Bank. Realbanc, Inc., U.S. National Bank, and Western Securities Company. 
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(Continued from Page 5) 
Summary 
The present study provides a look at 
the plea bargaining process from three 
perspectives-those of the prosecutor, the 
defense attorney, and the defendant. 
Attorneys' ratings and predictions of 
sentencing outcome allowed a comparison 
of the value of the major types of deals. 
Reducing felonies to misdemeanors, charg-
ing with lesser felonies, and promising 
not to file habitual criminal charges were 
viewed as the most valuable deals for 
defendants. 
Comparisons of judgments by the pros-
ecutor, defense attorney, and defendant 
on a number of issues related to the case 
were also made. The correlations between 
prosecutors' and defense attorneys' ratings 
of the defendant were generally quite 
high (e.g., r=.68 for ratings of the serious· 
ness of the defendant's prior record and 
r=.64 for ratings of the likelihood of 
defendant's committing another felony). 
High positive correlations were also found 
between their ratings on likelihood of 
conviction and on the value of the deal 
Vol. VII, No. 1 
offered to the defendant. Differences 
occurred, however, in the absolute ratings 
with prosecutors as a group relative to 
defense attorneys judging crimes as more 
serious, defendants as deserving more 
punishment, and deals as less valuable to 
defendants. 
Defendants' ratings of their attorneys 
were surprisingly high, and no significant 
difference between ratings of public de-
fenders and private attorneys occurred. 
The ratings on different dimensions 
were related to each other in meaningful 
ways. In the judgments of prosecutors and 
defense attorneys, for example, degree 
of punishment deserved by a defendant 
was strongly related to seriousness of 
the crime, the defendant's prior record, 
and the likelihood of the defendant's 
committing a felony in the future. No 
significant correlations were found, how-
ever, between the various factors relating 
to the case and the value of the deal as 
measured by judgments of prosecutors 
and defense attorneys. Therefore con-
clusions about what factors determine 
the value of a plea bargain are impossible. 
REVIEW OF APPLIED URBAN RESEARCH 
1 The category "lesser felony" has been 
greatly influenced by t wo homicide cases in 
which charges were reduced from second degree 
murder to manslaughter, thus reducing the 
predicted sentence from l ife (counted as 50 
years) to 10 years. This is essential ly the only 
kind of deal that would be made in murder 
cases. To deal wit h such problems a measure 
which controls for the length of the trial 
conviction sentence rather than the simple 
difference score could be more appropriate if 
1he sample size were larger. 
2Tests of significance were performed on ly 
for differences between prosecutors' and de-
fense attorneys' ratings because of the small 
number of defendants interviewed. For the 
same reason correlation coefficients were com-
puted only for the prosecutor-defense attorney 
comparison. 
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